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Interpreting focus
BART GEURTS & ROB VAN DER SANDT
Abstract
Although it is widely agreed, if often only tacitly, that there is a close connection
between focus and presupposition, recent research has tended to shy away from
the null hypothesis, which is that focus is systematically associated with presup-
position along the following lines:
The Background-Presupposition Rule (BPR)
Whenever focusing gives rise to a background lx:j(x), there is a presupposition to
the e¤ect that lx:j(x) holds of some individual.
This paper aims to show, ﬁrst, that the evidence in favour of the BPR
is in fact rather good, and attempts to clarify its role in the interpretation
of focus particles like ‘only’ and ‘too’, arguing that unlike the former the
latter is focus-sensitive in an idiosyncratic way, adding its own inter-
pretative constraints to those of the BPR. The last part of the paper dis-
cusses various objections that have been raised against the BPR, taking a
closer look at the peculiarities of ‘nobody’ and ‘somebody’, and compar-
ing the interpretative e¤ects of focusing with those of it-clefts.
1. Introduction
The phenomenon generally known as focusing raises two questions.
First: what is it? Second: how does it a¤ect interpretation? This paper
discusses the second question, and proposes a partial answer to it. The
ﬁrst question will not be addressed here. Of course, we will we have to
adopt certain assumptions about how it is to be answered, but none of
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our premisses are particularly controversial. To begin with, we assume
that focusing divides the content of an expression, as uttered on a given
occasion, into two parts: focus and background. For example:
(1) [Fred]F robbed the bank.
Here the focus is the semantic correlate of ‘Fred’; the background is the
semantic correlate of ‘. . . robbed the bank’, which may be viewed as
an open proposition, a property, or whatever. At any rate, taken on its
own the background of (1) does not entail that someone robbed the bank.
One further assumption regarding the phenomenology of focusing is that,
typically, focused information is intonationally prominent whilst back-
grounded information is not. We will not assume that a focus is always
signaled by intonational prominence, nor will we assume the contrary. In
other words, we prefer not to commit ourselves as to whether the division
between focus and background is a phonological feature or resides on a
more abstract level of analysis. For the purposes of this paper we will
simply adopt the standard view that focus is represented in syntax by a
special feature.
We just noted that the backgrounded information in (1) does not entail
that someone robbed the bank. This is not to say, however, that back-
grounding ‘robbed the bank’ allows the speaker to remain neutral as to
whether or not the bank was robbed. Rather, this background gives rise
to the presupposition that someone robbed the bank – or at least that is
one of our central claims in this paper, and it will be convenient to have a
name for it:
The Background-Presupposition Rule (BPR)
Whenever focusing gives rise to a background lx:j(x), there is a presupposition to
the e¤ect that lx:j(x) holds of some individual.
In order to give substance to this claim, we need a theory of presupposi-
tion, and we will be using a theory we developed in earlier work, which is
motivated entirely by considerations extraneous to the topic of the pres-
ent discussion; the main outlines of our treatment of presupposition are
recapitulated in Section 3 below. Given that framework, we will argue
that the BPR goes a long way to explaining the interpretative e¤ects of
focusing. However, the BPR alone will not su‰ce for the simple reason
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that certain lexemes impose additional constraints on the interpretation
of focus. For example, as will be discussed at length in Section 5, exclu-
sive focus particles like ‘only’ interact with focus in a way that is rather
di¤erent from additive particles like ‘too’. If this much is right, a theory
of focus interpretation cannot consist only of general principles, such as
the BPR, but will also have to attend to the idiosyncracies of individual
words that associate with focus.
The idea that focus and presupposition are related phenomena is not
new. However, most of the authors who have considered the relationship
have concluded that the simple and systematic connection suggested by
the BPR cannot be maintained, and the currently prevailing opinion is
that focus and presupposition should be treated by separate modules.
Against this general trend we argue, on the one hand, that none of the
arguments against a close connection between presupposition and focus is
sound (Section 6), and on the other hand, that when the link is severed
the systematic correspondence between the interpretation of focus and
presupposition will be left unaccounted for (Section 4).
Before we proceed, we would like to make one preliminary remark
concerning the status of the BPR. The intuitive motivation for the BPR
will be evident. Assuming that the principal function of focusing is to
evoke a set of alternatives, it seems plausible to assume that there is a
general presumption to the e¤ect that one of these alternatives applies.
For example, in (1) the e¤ect of backgrounding ‘robbed the bank’ is to
draw the hearer’s attention to the issue who may have robbed the bank
(while the sentence is used to assert that Fred is the one). The BPR takes
this to mean that it is presupposed that one of the individuals who may
have robbed the bank actually did. There are two ways of interpreting
this claim. On a strong construal of the BPR, backgrounds are invariably
associated with presuppositions, whereas on a weak construal back-
grounding engenders presuppositions by default: backgrounded material
is presupposed only in the absence of indicators to the contrary. In our
view, the weak version of BPR is at least as plausible as the strong ver-
sion, but for methodological reasons we are going to defend the strong
version. From a methodological point of view, the main di¤erence be-
tween the weak and strong versions of the BPR is that the former leaves
more room for accommodating problem cases than the latter does, so by
adopting the strong version we restrict our maneuvering space.
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2. The state of the art
Current approaches to the interpretation of focus range from localist, on
one end of the spectrum, to centralist, on the other. Localist theories ex-
plain the interpretative e¤ects of focusing on the level of particular ex-
pressions or constructions that appear to be focus-sensitive. For example,
Krifka (1999) proposes to account for the focus sensitivity of statements
by postulating an covert assertion operator whose deﬁnition makes refer-
ence to focus-induced alternatives:
(2) assert(M;A; c) (a sentence with meaning M and alternatives A in
a context c is asserted): the speaker claims M (in c), and for every
alternative M 0 A A, M 00M, the speaker explicitly does not claim
M 0 (in c).
Another specimen of the localist approach is Kratzer’s (1989) analysis of
negation, which starts out from the observation that the following pair of
sentences have di¤erent construals, and that the di¤erence may be char-
acterised in presuppositional terms:
(3) a. Paula isn’t registered in [Paris]F.
b. [Paula]F isn’t registered in Paris.
According to Kratzer, while (3a) presupposes that Paula is registered at
some place which is not Paris, the presupposition of (3b) is that some
person who is not Paula is registered in Paris. Although in our opinion
this is not quite right,1 we are interested here mainly in the sort of analysis
Kratzer envisages. Without going into the technical details of Kratzer’s
proposal, she takes the contrast in (3) to show that negation must be
treated not in terms of a unary operator but rather as a form of quantiﬁ-
cation: ‘Every negation operator has a restrictive clause which results
from the original clause by replacing the focused phrase by an appropri-
ate variable.’ (1989: 646) Hence, on Kratzer’s analysis, the lexical mean-
ing of ‘not’ makes reference to the focus/background division of the ma-
terial in its scope.
1 The standard diagnostics for presuppositionhood show that (3a) presupposes that Paula
is registered somewhere (cf. Section 4 below). What Kratzer takes to the presupposition
of (3a) is in fact entailed by the sentence’s assertion and presupposition taken together.
The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for (3b).
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The obvious problem with localist analyses such as these is that they
fail to capture general trends in the interpretation of focus. For example,
we will argue below that Kratzer’s observations about negation are merely
special instances of a pervasive pattern, and if this is right, the contrast
between (3a) and (3b) should not be put down to the lexical meaning
of ‘not’. Indeed, we don’t see any reason for assuming that the semantics
of ‘not’ makes reference to focus or background at all. Analogous re-
marks apply to Krifka’s treatment of assertion.
Centralist approaches to focus attempt to capture what is common to
all uses of focusing. The best-known theory of this kind is Rooth’s (1992),
which we will illustrate, again without going into details, by way of his
analysis of ‘only’:
(4) a. Mary only [danced]F.
b. EP[P A C5P(m)! P ¼ dance 0]
c. Focus-determined constraint: CJ kVPkf
Rooth analyses (4a) as (4b), where the capital C represents a set of possi-
bilities to be ﬁlled in by the context. Focusing is viewed by Rooth as
constraining such indeterminacies. He presents a single principle under-
lying the interpretation of focus, which in this particular case yields
the constraint in (4c), where kVPkf is the focus-semantic value of VP, i.e.
the set of alternatives to the interpretation of ‘dance’, which is reduced
to the set of contextually relevant alternatives by requiring that C is a
subset of it. So if kVPkf ¼ fdance 0; sing 0; drink 0; cheer 0g, C might be
fdance 0; sing 0g, say, in which case (4b) entails that Mary didn’t sing.
One problem with Rooth’s analysis is that its predictions tend to be too
weak. For example, it fails to predict that (3a) will normally be heard as
implying that Paula is registered somewhere. Another problem, which is
typical of centralist theories generally, is that the interpretative e¤ects of
focusing are not always the same. As we will try to show in the following,
focusing a¤ects the interpretation expressions like ‘always’, ‘only’, and
‘too’ in subtly di¤erent ways, and that being so, no collection of general
principles will adequately account for the semantics and pragmatics of
focusing.
The upshot of the foregoing observations is that we need a theory
which lies somewhere between the radically localist and centralist ap-
proaches we have just outlined; a theory, that is, which holds that there
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are certain general principles constraining the interpretation of focus,
while accepting at the same time that certain expressions or constructions
may add constraints of their own. Such a theory will outlined in the
following.
One recurring issue in recent discussions of focus is what has been
called the problem of ‘requantiﬁcation’ (Rooth 1987, 1995, von Fintel
1994, Krifka 2001). The problem arises when backgrounded material
contains an indeﬁnite expression, as in the following example:
(5) A dog is usually [intelligent]F.
On its most likely reading, (5) implies that most dogs are intelligent.
However, on some accounts this reading is not forthcoming. Assuming
that the adverbial quantiﬁer ‘usually’ ranges over event-like entities (e.g.
situations, cases, or time intervals), and that the backgrounded material
in (5) helps to restrict the domain of ‘usually’, some theories of focus in-
terpretation will produce an analysis along the following lines:
(6) Most situations that contain a dog contain a dog that is intelligent.
The problem with this is that the indeﬁnite NP ‘a dog’ is used twice, as a
result of which certain states of a¤airs that should falsify (5) make its
purported analysis (6) come out true. For example, in a world in which
dogs always come in pairs, one of which is intelligent while the other is
not, (5) is false but (6) is true. Similarly, on this type of analysis the fol-
lowing comes out true, which is clearly wrong:
(7) An arm is almost always attached to the [left]F shoulder.
Various proposals for dealing with this problem have been made, some
of which are quite drastic. For example, it has been suggested by Krifka
(2001) that an adequate treatment of cases like (5) and (7) requires that
the novelty condition on indeﬁnites be annulled, while von Fintel uses
these cases to motivate rather drastic innovations in the treatment of ad-
verbial quantiﬁcation. However, these various proposals all run into the
same objection, which is that they merely address a special case of much
bigger problem. What seems to have escaped notice thus far is that the
requantiﬁcation problem is not restricted to the interpretation of focus,
and is just another instance of what in the presupposition literature has
come to be known as the ‘binding problem’.
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Like the requantiﬁcation problem, the binding problem of presuppo-
sition arises because, according to some accounts, an indeﬁnite must
sometimes be evaluated more than once. The trouble this causes is illus-
trated by Karttunen and Peters’ (1979) example:
(8) ?Someone managed to succeed George V on the throne of England.
This sentence is pragmatically infelicitous: it suggests that the person who
succeeded George V found it di‰cult to do so, which can hardly be the
case (at least not in the relevant sense; George V’s successor may well
have had problems adjusting to his position, but he obtained it without
e¤ort). Apparently, the presupposition triggered by the verb ‘manage’
fails in this case. The problem is that many theories of presupposition
(including Karttunen and Peters’ own) cannot account for this kind of
infelicity, because they strictly separate between asserted and presupposed
material, as a consequence of which the interpretation of (8) is predicted
to consist out of the following components:
(9) a. Assertion: Someone succeeded George V on the throne of
England.
b. Presupposition: It was di‰cult for someone to succeed George
V on the throne of England.
Unfortunately, thus construed the presupposition triggered by ‘manage’
comes out true: nearly everybody would have had a hard time succeeding
George V. This is a problem not only for Karttunen and Peters’ own
treatment of presupposition, but for many theories of a younger vintage,
as well, including Heim’s (1983). The problem arises because presupposed
and asserted content are separated too strictly. We need to distinguish
between presupposition and assertion, obviously, but the two should
remain connected, as suggested by the following sketch of an analysis
of (9):
(10) (Assertion:) Someonei succeeded George V on the throne of
England, and (presupposition:) it was di‰cult for that personi to
succeed George V on the throne of England.
We submit that the requantiﬁcation problem and the binding problem
are identical at root. In both cases, the trouble is caused by an overly
strict compartmentalisation of di¤erent types of information. If this
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diagnosis is correct, the binding problem is a more general one, and
should also arise in the analysis of implicature, for example – which it
does, as van der Sandt (1992) has shown. Geurts and Maier (2003) dis-
cuss a range of examples showing that binding problems are prone to
arise wherever di¤erent types of linguistic content interact, and they pro-
pose a general framework for solving such problems. The binding theory
of presupposition, which we are about to outline, applies this general
framework to model the interplay between presupposed and non-
presupposed information, solving the binding problems of presupposition
and focusing at the same time.
3. The binding theory of presupposition
What does it mean to say that (an utterance of ) a sentence presupposes
something? For example, what exactly does the following sentence
presuppose?
(11) Everybody was gay.
There was a time when presupposition theorists would have said that (11)
presupposes that there are, or were, people. This much can hardly be
wrong – and that is precisely the problem. It is evident that (11) implies
that there are people, but if that is all the sentence conveys by way of
presupposition, then for practical purposes the sentence doesn’t presup-
pose anything: it can always be taken for granted that there are people.
And this problem is not solved by requiring that that the context entails
that there are people; for there are people in every context.
Intuitively speaking, it is clear enough how the presupposition triggered
by the quantiﬁer in (11) is to be analysed. It is plain that this sentence will
normally be uttered in a situation in which a particular set of people
is already given, and that is what the presuppositional requirement of
the sentence boils down to. The function of the presupposition triggered
by the quantiﬁer is to retrieve from the context a set of individuals for
the remainder of the sentence to make a statement about. Hence, pre-
suppositions function not unlike pronouns. The requirements they impose
on the context are of the same sort: they want to be bound. This is the key
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idea in our account of presupposition, which we therefore call the ‘ana-
phoric binding theory’ of presupposition, or ‘binding theory’ for short.2
The binding theory’s central tenet is that pronominal anaphora is a
species of presupposition, the distinctive trait of pronouns being that, by
and large, they must be bound. Presuppositions in general, however,
merely prefer to be bound. If on occasion a suitable antecedent is not
available, a presupposition will generally be accommodated (Karttunen
1974, Stalnaker 1974, Lewis 1979). But accommodation is a repair strat-
egy: ceteris paribus, if a suitable antecedent is available, the binding op-
tion is preferred.
The binding theory is implemented in the framework of Discourse
Representation Theory (Kamp 1981, Kamp and Reyle 1993), and qua
theory of pronominal anaphora it more or less coincides with classical
DRT. The following analysis illustrates what we mean when we say that
presuppositions may be bound like anaphors:3,4
(12) a. If anybody cheered, then it was Wilma who cheered.
b. [x: Wilma(x), [y: cheered(y)]) [z: cheered(z), z ¼ x]]
c. [x: Wilma(x), [y: cheered(y), z: z ¼ y, cheered(z)]) [: z ¼ x]]
d. [x: Wilma(x), [y: cheered(y)]) [: y ¼ x]]
2 The binding theory was ﬁrst proposed by van der Sandt (1989), and further developed
by van der Sandt and Geurts (1991), van der Sandt (1992), and Geurts (1999). The
theory has been taken up by Krahmer (1998), Krahmer and van Deemter (1998), Asher
and Lascarides (1998), Bos (1999), Kamp (2001), and Spenader (2002). Zeevat’s (1992)
account is closely related.
3 The following treatment of it-clefts simpliﬁes matters somewhat; cf. Section 6. In the
same vein, we o‰cially regard names a deﬁnite (and therefore presuppositional) ex-
pressions; the name ‘Wilma’ is semantically equivalent with ‘the person named ‘Wilma’ ’
(see Geurts 1997, 1999 for discussion). However, for expository convenience we will al-
ways start from DRSs in which all names have been processed already. Note further-
more that in (13a) (and many similar examples) the referent for the proper name and the
referent introduced by the cleft originate in the same sub-DRS which precludes binding
the latter to the former.
4 A note on notation: in earlier work we used a linear notation which depicted a DRS as
being of the form [u1; . . . ; um: j1; . . . ; jn], where u1; . . . ; um are reference markers and
j1; . . . ; jn are DRS-conditions. Here we introduce a lightly emended notation, which
aims to enhance readability by allowing any reference marker to immediately precede
the condition(s) it ‘belongs with’. The formal syntax of the DRS language remains the
same.
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In the second part of (12a) the it-cleft triggers the presupposition that
someone cheered, which is represented in (12b) by the underlined material
(we ignore any other presuppositions (12a) may contain). This presuppo-
sition has access to a suitable antecedent in the ﬁrst part of the condi-
tional, and hence it is bound as shown in (12c), which represents the ﬁnal
interpretation of the sentence, and is equivalent to (12d). Note that it does
not follow from (12c, d) that someone cheered, and thus the presupposi-
tion that this is the case is in a sense absorbed in the protasis.
A presupposition that cannot be bound will normally be accom-
modated,5 which is to say that it is added to some DRS that is accessible
to the DRS in which it was triggered (call this the presupposition’s ‘home
DRS’). If a presupposition is triggered within an embedded DRS, there is
in general more than one DRS in which it might be accommodated. The
binding theory claims that in such an event the least embedded DRS is
the preferred accommodation site.
(13) a. If it was Barney who cheered, we’re in trouble.
b. [x: Barney(x), [z: cheered(z), z ¼ x]) [: we’re in trouble]]
c. [x: Barney(x), z: cheered(z), [: z ¼ x]) [: we’re in trouble]]
In (13a) the presupposition that someone cheered is triggered in an em-
bedded position. Since this presupposition cannot be bound, it will have
to be accommodated.6 There are two DRSs accessible to its home DRS:
the home DRS itself and the main DRS. But as accommodation in the
least embedded DRS is taken to be the preferred option, the binding
theory predicts that the default reading of this sentence is (13c), which
seems correct.
A presupposition that cannot be bound is preferably accommodated in
the main DRS. However, this default preference may be overwritten in
various ways.
(14) a. Either nobody cheered or it was Barney who cheered (did so).
b. [x: Barney(x), [: s[y: cheered(y)]]4[z: cheered(z), z ¼ x]]
5 ‘Normally’, because accommodation is not always possible; see below.
6 In fact, this is not a very realistic example, because the presuppositions triggered by it-
clefts are typically, though not invariably, required to be contextually given, which is to
say that normally speaking they have to be bound (cf. Section 6).
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c. [x: Barney(x), z: cheered(z), [: s[y: cheered(y)]]4[: z ¼ x]]
d. [x: Barney(x), [: s[y: cheered(y)]]4[z: cheered(z), z ¼ x]]
In (14a) the presupposition that someone cheered is triggered in the sec-
ond disjunct. Again, this presupposition cannot be bound to a suitable
antecedent,7 and will therefore have to be accommodated. As in the pre-
vious example, the presupposition may be accommodated either in its
home DRS or in the main DRS, but in this case the latter option would
result in an interpretation, represented by (14c), which renders it infe-
licitous, and therefore the former option is preferred. Hence, the pre-
dicted reading, given in (14d), is that either nobody cheered or Barney
cheered. Adopting Heim’s (1983) terminology, the presupposition is ac-
commodated ‘locally’ in this case, although in general ‘global’ accommo-
dation (i.e. accommodation in the main DRS) is the preferred option.
If a presupposition must be accommodated and cannot be accom-
modated in the main DRS, the binding theory predicts that there is a
preference for accommodating it further down in the chain of DRSs
linking the presupposition’s home DRS with the main DRS. Thus it may
happen that a presupposition is preferably accommodated in a DRS that
is neither its home DRS nor the main DRS. We will refer to such cases as
instances of intermediate (as opposed to local or global) accommodation.
A special variety of intermediate accommodation occurs when a pre-
supposition contains a discourse referent that is bound between the main
DRS and the presupposition’s home DRS. The binding theory predicts
that in such an event global accommodation is ruled out (because the re-
sulting DRS would not be a proper one), and that intermediate accom-
modation is the preferred option. The following is a case in point:
(15) Everyone should leave their camera at the reception desk.
This will ordinarily be interpreted as conveying that everyone who has
a camera is to leave it at the reception desk, which is to say that a pre-
supposition triggered in the nuclear scope of the quantiﬁer ‘everyone’
ends up restricting its scope. To show in some detail how the binding
7 In standard DRT, that is. See Krahmer and Muskens (1995) for a version of DRT in
which antecedents in the ﬁrst disjunct may, under certain circumstances, bind anaphors
in the second. See Geurts (1999) and van der Sandt (to appear) for further discussion.
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theory accounts for this reading, we will employ Kamp and Reyle’s
(1993) ‘duplex conditions’.
(16) a. [: [x: person(x)]hExi[u; v: camera(v), u owns v, x leave v]]
b. [: [x: person(x), u: u ¼ x]
hExi[v: camera(v), u owns v, x leave v]]
c. [: [x: person(x)]hExi[v: camera(v), x owns v, x leave v]]
d. [: [x: person(x), v: camera(v), x owns v]hExi[: x leave v]]
(16a) is the semantic representation of (15) in which only the two pre-
suppositions triggered by ‘their camera’ remain to be processed; ‘x leave
v’ is short for ‘x should leave v at the reception desk’. (16a) contains a
duplex condition of the form ‘jhQuic’, where j and c are DRSs, Q is a
quantiﬁer, and u is a discourse referent. We take it that the intended in-
terpretation of this structure is transparent enough, and will not discuss it
in detail.8 The deﬁnite NP ‘their camera’ triggers the two-part presuppo-
sition that (i) there is an individual u and that (ii) v is a camera owned
by u. The ﬁrst presupposition is bound to the discourse referent x in the
domain of the quantiﬁer, as shown in (16b), which is equivalent to (16c).
The second presupposition cannot be bound and must therefore be ac-
commodated. Accommodation in the principal DRS is not possible be-
cause this presupposition contains a discourse referent, i.e. x, which is
introduced in the domain of the quantiﬁer, and so the binding theory
predicts that accommodation in the restrictor is the next-preferred option,
and we obtain the DRS in (16d), which represents the intended reading of
(15).9
It bears emphasising that accommodation is not a rule of interpretation
that is applied in a robot-like fashion, but rather a repair strategy whose
success is not guaranteed. Imagine, for example, that the following is ut-
tered out of the blue:
(17) It’s splendid.
This utterance will be defective if it isn’t clear what the pronoun is sup-
posed to refer to. That is to say, the presupposition triggered by the pro-
8 See Kamp and Reyle (1993: Chapter 4) and Geurts and van der Sandt (1999) for further
discussion.
9 See Beaver (2001) for a di¤erent view.
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noun must be bound. The reason for this is that descriptively attenuate
presuppositions cannot be interpreted by way of accommodation, simply
because they are not semantically too impoverished (cf. van der Sandt
1992). Which is not to imply that a su‰ciently speciﬁc presupposition can
always be accommodated. Suppose someone says, again out of the blue:
(18) When I came home last night, I noticed immediately that the guil-
lotine had been ﬁddled with.
The problem with this is not so much that ‘the guillotine’ is not speciﬁc
enough, but rather that it is remarkable that in our day and age a private
person should own one – and presupposed information is expected to be
unremarkable (cf. Heim 1982 and the extensive literature on bridging). In
sum, presuppositions that are insu‰ciently speciﬁc and bland will not be
accommodated without further ado.
The binding theory solves the so-called ‘binding problem’ by adopting
an integrated representation of presupposed and non-presupposed con-
tent. Karttunen and Peters’ example, repeated below as (19a), is analysed
as in (19b):
(19) a. ?Someone managed to succeed George V on the throne of
England.
b. [x: x succeeded GV, it was di‰cult for x to succeed GV]
The underlined material in this DRS is presupposed whilst the remainder
is not, but the two types of information are not segregated entirely. In
particular, the presupposition contains a discourse referent that is not it-
self presupposed, so the indeﬁnite ‘someone’ does not have to be eval-
uated twice, as it would have to on other accounts of presupposition. As
is shown by Geurts and Maier (2003) this treatment of the binding prob-
lem is quite general, and applies to all sorts of non-asserted content.
One last note before we leave this section. In this paper we adopt the
common practice of speaking of local, intermediate, and global accom-
modation, and this usage is liable to suggest that there are three very dif-
ferent forms of accommodation, and perhaps even that there are three
di¤erent interpretative mechanisms at work. In other theories this may be
so. Accommodation is a well-known problem for non-representational
theories of presupposition, which are forced to do so by making a princi-
pled distinction between local, intermediate, and global accommodation.
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By contrast, the binding theory does not require special-purpose devices
for dealing with any particular variety of accommodation. There is just a
single principle stating that presuppositional material will ceteris paribus
settle as high as possible in the DRS. There are no dedicated procedures
for handling accommodation, and the terms ‘global’, ‘intermediate’, and
‘global’ merely serve to characterise the output of the theory; they don’t
play a role in the theory.
4. Focus interpretation as projection
We maintain that backgrounded information gives rise to presupposi-
tions; more concretely, our claim is the following:10
The Background-Presupposition Rule (BPR)
Whenever focusing gives rise to a background lx:j(x), there is a presupposition to
the e¤ect that lx:j(x) holds of some individual.
The main prediction that the BPR gives rise to can be stated quite in-
dependently of the theory of presupposition we happen to favour. It is
that focusing should cause the projection behaviour that is characteristic
of deﬁnite noun phrases, factive verbs, and the like. This prediction is
borne out by the data, as the following observations illustrate. To begin
with, (20a, b) illustrate the familiar fact that presuppositions triggered by
deﬁnite noun phrases tend to ‘escape’ from embedded positions: both
sentences imply, in default of information to the contrary, that Fred has a
wife. According to the BPR, the same should hold for the backgrounded
information that someone stole the tarts, and this seems to be right: both
sentences suggest rather strongly that someone stole the tarts. These in-
ferences are defeasible, to be sure, but if they are presuppositions it is only
to be expected that they should be.
10 It is usually said that presuppositions are ‘triggered’ by certain lexemes or syntactic
constructions. A factive verb, for example, triggers the presupposition that its com-
plement is true. In our formulation of the BPR we deliberately avoid this terminology,
because we are not convinced that the relation between focus and presupposition is in
all respects the same as that between conventional presupposition triggers and their
presuppositions.
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(20) a. If [Fred’s wife]F stole the tarts, then Fred is innocent.
b. If Fred is innocent, then [his wife]F stole the tarts.
In general, presuppositions tend to ﬂoat up from syntactically em-
bedded positions, but in certain special cases their passage is blocked. For
example, in (21a) the presupposition that Fred has a wife, which is trig-
gered by the deﬁnite in the consequent of the conditional, is absorbed by
the information in the antecedent. The BPR entails that the same should
hold for backgrounded information, and (21b) shows that it does, for
unlike e.g. (20a) this sentence does not suggest in any way that someone
stole the tarts:
(21) a. If Fred has a wife, then Fred’s wife stole the tarts.
b. If someone stole the tarts, then [Fred’s wife]F stole the tarts.
These examples illustrate that in conditionals backgrounded information
displays the projection behaviour that is characteristic of presupposition.
Similar patterns are found with other operators, for example modals:
(22) a. Maybe [Fred’s wife]F stole the tarts.
b. Maybe Fred has a wife and maybe [his wife]F stole the tarts.
c. Maybe the tarts were stolen and maybe [Fred’s wife]F stole the
tarts.
In the absence of indicators to the contrary, a speaker conveys with (22a)
that Fred is married, so in this sense at least the presupposition triggered
by ‘Fred’s wife’ is interpreted outside the scope of the modal expression
‘maybe’. That this presupposition can be neutralised is shown by (22b),
which does not imply that Fred has a wife. Another suggestion conveyed
by (22a) is that someone stole the tarts, which makes sense if the back-
grounded material under the scope of the modal gives rise to a presup-
position, and as expected this inference, too, can be blocked, as shown by
(22c).
For good measure, let us look at one more example:
(23) a. [Fred’s wife]F didn’t steal the tarts.
b. I’m still not convinced that the tarts were stolen, but surely
[Fred’s wife]F didn’t steal them.
As illustrated by (23a), an ordinary presupposition typically behaves as if
it was interpreted outside the scope of any negation operators: normally
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speaking an utterance of this sentence would be taken to imply that Fred
has a wife. Analogously, an utterance of this sentence would normally
imply that somebody stole the tarts, which is what the BPR predicts. And
as (23b) shows, this inference is suspended in certain special cases, which
is characteristic of presuppositional inferences, too. Thus, the way nega-
tion interacts with focus is just an instance of a larger pattern; pace
Kratzer (1989), we conclude that there is nothing special about negation
in this regard (cf. Section 2).
These observations should su‰ce to show that backgrounded informa-
tion generally gives rise to presuppositions. This is strong evidence in fa-
vour of the BPR, and by the same token these data present a formidable
challenge to any account which rejects the notion that there is an intimate
connection between focusing and presupposition. It is hardly surprising,
then, that none of the theories that try to get by without the BPR (or
something like it) can account for the pervasive parallels illustrated in the
foregoing.
Thus far we have presented our case for the BPR in purely observa-
tional terms. Our theory of presupposition hasn’t entered the fray yet. It
will be fairly obvious, at least in outline, how the binding theory accounts
for the facts we have mustered, so let us restrict our attention to one ex-
ample, viz. the contrast between (20b) and (21b).11
(24) a. [: [x: x stole the tarts]
) [u: u is Fred’s wife, v: v stole the tarts, u stole the tarts]]
b. [u: u is Fred’s wife, [x: x stole the tarts]
) [v: v stole the tarts, u stole the tarts]]
c. [u: u is Fred’s wife, [x: x stole the tarts]) [: u stole the tarts]]
In (24a), which is the initial representation of (21b), there are two pre-
suppositions (any other presuppositions the sentence may contain are
ignored). One presupposition is triggered by the deﬁnite noun phrase
11 The choice is not entirely arbitrary, because for examples like (20b) logic-based theories
of presupposition like the satisfaction theory yield predictions that are too weak. If we
incorporated the BPR in such a framework, the predicted presupposition would be: ‘If
Fred is innocent, then someone stole the tarts’ – which is weaker than what is intuitively
observed. See Geurts (1996, 1999) for discussion of this issue.
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‘Fred’s wife’. It does not have a suitable antecedent, and therefore it is
accommodated in the main DRS, as shown in (24b). The other presup-
position arises from the BPR: in the consequent of (21b), the semantic
correlate of ‘stole the tarts’ is backgrounded, and therefore we have a
presupposition to the e¤ect that someone stole the tarts. Treating this like
any other presupposition, the binding theory predicts that it will be bound
to the material introduced in the antecedent of the conditional, and the
resulting interpretation is represented by (24c).
In (20b), the presupposition that Fred has a wife is interpreted as it is
in (21b), but in this case the presupposition induced through the BPR
does not have a suitable antecedent, so we predict that it will be accom-
modated in the main DRS, which yields the following interpretation:
(25) [u: u is Fred’s wife, v: v stole the tarts,
[: Fred is innocent]) [: u stole the tarts]]
This prediction is correct, too. The remaining examples discussed above
are analysed along the same lines.
One of the more intriguing problems of interpretation posed by focus-
ing is how backgrounded material in the nuclear scope of a quantiﬁer can
end up constraining the quantiﬁer’s domain. The following is a case in
point:
(26) Beryl always drinks [sherry]F.
The most likely interpretation of this sentence is that, whenever Beryl
drinks something, what she drinks is sherry.12 On this construal, the
quantiﬁer ‘always’ ranges over situations in which Beryl is drinking, but
strangely enough the only mention of drinking in (26) occurs in what
would seem to be the quantiﬁer’s nuclear scope. The problem is reminis-
cent of one discussed earlier, when we explained how a presupposition
triggered in the nuclear scope of a quantiﬁer may serve to restrict its
domain (see example (15) and the ensuing discussion). On the account
we propose the expanation of the two cases is not merely similar, but
identical.
12 The phenomenon has been discussed, among others, by Krifka (1991) and Rooth (1995).
A recent discussion is found in Beaver & Clark (2003).
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(27) a. [x: Beryl(x), [e: ]hEei[u: x drinks u in e, x drinks u in e,
sherry(u)]]
b. [x: Beryl(x), u: x drinks u in e, [e: ]hEei[ x drinks u in e,
sherry(u)]]
c. [x: Beryl(x), [e; u: x drinks u in e]hEei[: x drinks u in e,
sherry(u)]]
(27a) is the semantic representation of (26) as it comes out of the gram-
mar, except that the presupposition triggered by the proper name ‘Beryl’
has already been dealt with. In this DRS the domain of the adverbial
quantiﬁer is practically empty; only a fresh discourse referent is in-
troduced. We would assume that, as a matter fact, the lexical semantics of
‘always’ imposes certain rather general restrictions on the possible values
this discourse referent can take, but these restrictions are left out of ac-
count here. In the nuclear scope of ‘always’, ‘Beryl drinks . . .’ is back-
grounded, and therefore the BPR induces the underlined presupposition
in (27a). This presupposition cannot be bound, so the binding theory
predicts that it will be accommodated – more precisely, that it will be ac-
commodated in the least embedded position that is compatible with gen-
eral requirements of semantic and pragmatic felicity. By default, this
means that the presupposition is accommodated in the main DRS, but in
this particular case that is not an option, because global accommodation
would result in an improper DRS, in which the discourse referent e occurs
free, as shown in (27b). The second option is to accommodate the pre-
supposition one level down, in the restrictor of ‘always’, and as there is
nothing to prevent this, we predict that (27c) is the preferred reading of
(26), which is correct.
In Section 2 above we saw that various proposals for the interpretation
of focus run into the so-called ‘requantiﬁcation problem’, which we illus-
trated with the following example:
(28) An arm is almost always attached to the [left]F shoulder. (¼ (7))
The problem with this sentence, it will be recalled, is that we want
to avoid construing it as, ‘Almost always when an arm is attached to
a shoulder, an arm is attached to the left shoulder’, on which reading
(28) would come out true. Rather, the reading one would like to have is,
‘Almost always when an arm is attached to a shoulderi, iti is the left
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shoulder’, which makes the sentence false. To show how this reading is
obtained, we start out from (29a) as the initial representation of (28):
(29) a. [: [e; u: arm(u)]hGEei[v: shoulder(v), u is attached to v in e, u is
attached to v in e, left(v)]]
b. [: [e; u: arm(u), v: shoulder(v), u is attached to v in e]hGEei[: u
is attached to v in e, left(v)]]
The underlined material in (29a) is the presupposition induced by the
BPR, which ends up being accommodated in the restrictor of the quanti-
ﬁer, as in the previous example (accommodation at toplevel would leave e
free in a condition). The resulting DRS, (29b), says that in almost every
situation in which an arm is attached to a shoulder, the shoulder in ques-
tion is the left one, which is the reading we wanted to account for.
5. Focus particles
In the foregoing we discussed how focusing a¤ects the interpretation of
conditionals, modals, negation, and quantiﬁcation, and argued that such
focus e¤ects as are observable in these environments can be accounted for
by a single general principle, the BPR. If we are right about this, none of
these expressions require a special treatment; they all interact with focus
in the same way. Not all focus-sensitive expressions are like this however.
In particular, so-called ‘focus particles’ are focus-sensitive in idiosyncratic
ways, which is to say that this category of expression calls for a more lo-
calist approach.13 However, a purely localist treatment of focus particles
is not advisable, because even if each focus particle has its own pecu-
liarities, the BPR restricts the interpretation of focus particles just as it
restricts the interpretations of other expressions.
In this section we present analyses of two focus particles: ‘only’ and
‘too’. Presupposition enters our analyses in two di¤erent ways: in both
cases through the BPR, and in the case of ‘too’ we argue that this particle
imposes additional presuppositional requirements of its own.
13 The diversity of focus-sensitive expressions is the central theme of Beaver and Clark
(2003).
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Only
Although ‘only’ is a controversial word, the controversy is not about
what information it conveys. Practically everybody would agree that e.g.
(30) carries the information that Wilma guessed the secret word and that
apart from Wilma nobody else guessed it:
(30) Only [Wilma]F guessed the secret word.
The main issue is what parts, if any, of the informational content of (30)
are entailed, presupposed, implicated, or what have you. In particular, it
appears that (30) implies that:
(31) Wilma guessed the secret word.
But how exactly does (31) relate to (30)? Is it an entailment (Atlas 1993),
a presupposition (Horn 1969), a conversational implicature (McCawley
1993), or just an illusion (Geach 1962)? There is some prima facie evi-
dence that (31) is a presupposition of (30). It is that the negation of (30)
also seems to imply the truth of (31):
(32) Not only [Wilma]F guessed the secret word.
It is for this reason, presumably, that Horn’s (1969) presuppositional
analysis has won so many converts.
However, if (30) really presupposed (31), we should expect this infer-
ence to exhibit projection behaviour in other environments, too – which it
doesn’t:
(33) a. It is possible that only [Wilma]F guessed the secret word.
b. If only [Wilma]F guessed the secret word, she has won @100.
c. Did only [Wilma]F guess the secret word?
d. ?If Wilma guessed the secret word, then only [Wilma]F guessed
the secret word.
According to our intuitions, none of (33a–c) suggest very strongly that
Wilma guessed the secret word, as we should expect if this proposition
had presuppositional status. And if we try to set up an environment in
which presuppositions usually don’t go through, as in (33d), the result is
that the focus particle itself must be focused in order for the sentence to
be felicitous at all; as it stands, (33d) is simply incoherent. Moreover, as
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observed by Horn (1996), if (30) did presuppose (31), exchanges like the
following should be quite peculiar, because right after A has indicated
that he doesn’t know who guessed the secret word, B would presuppose
(i.e. take it to be common knowledge) that Wilma guessed the secret
word:
(34) A: Who guessed the secret word?
B: Only [Wilma]F guessed the secret word.
But of course this is a perfectly normal question-answer sequence. So all
in all there is little to recommend the idea (30) presupposes (31), though
it remains to be seen where this leaves the fact that the negation of (30)
seems to imply (31) just as (30) does.
Recanting his earlier proposal, Horn (1996) has proposed an alterna-
tive analysis of ‘only’, which is based on the idea that it functions se-
mantically as the inverse of ‘all’ (cf. also Lo¨bner 1986). According to this
analysis ‘Only A B’ is taken to be semantically equivalent to ‘All B A’.
Thus the following are truth-conditionally equivalent, though they may
achieve di¤erent pragmatic e¤ects:
(35) a. Only [crooks]F are lawyers.
b. All lawyers are crooks.
Similarly, in Horn’s quantiﬁer analysis (30) becomes equivalent with the
somewhat cumbersome: ‘Everyone who guessed the secret word is identi-
cal to Wilma.’ On this account, (30) no longer presupposes (31) but as
strong quantiﬁers generally have existential import, it implies that some-
one guessed the secret word, for the same reason that its universal para-
phrase does. (30) asserts (i) that everyone who guessed the secret word is
identical to Wilma; it implies (ii), by way of existential import of the uni-
versal quantiﬁer, that someone guessed the secret word; and between
them (i) and (ii) entail (31). Hence, (31) is part of the communicative
content of (30), but it is neither a presupposition nor an implicature.
A key piece in Horn’s analysis is that universal quantiﬁers have exis-
tential import. Horn chooses to remain agnostic as to the etiology of ex-
istential import, but following Strawson (1950, 1952) and Hart (1951),
and in line with the prevailing opinion in the literature on presupposition
and quantiﬁcation, we will assume here that existential import is a matter
of presupposition: a strong quantiﬁer induces the presupposition that it
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ranges over a non-empty domain.14 In conjunction with Horn’s analysis
of ‘only’ this yields the prediction that (30) presupposes that someone
guessed the secret word, and this prediction is conﬁrmed by the standard
tests for presuppositionhood, as witness the following observations:
(36) a. It’s possible that only [Wilma]F guessed the secret word.
b. Nobody guessed the secret word, so it’s not possible that only
[Wilma]F guessed it.
(37) a. If Betty didn’t get it right, only [Wilma]F guessed the secret
word.
b. If anybody guessed the secret word, only [Wilma]F did.
Intuitively, the (a) sentences imply that someone guessed the secret word,
while the same inference is blocked in the (b) sentences. This is what we
should expect if (30) induced the presupposition that someone guessed the
secret word.
The main evidence Horn adduces in favour of his proposal concerns
the monotonicity properties of ‘only’ and the way it interacts with nega-
tive polarity items (NPIs). If we assume that ‘Only B A’ is semantically
equivalent to ‘All A B’, then the ﬁrst argument position of ‘only’ should
be upward entailing, while its second argument should be downward en-
tailing. That is, we should get the following entailment patterns, for
A 0JA and BJB 0:
all A B 0 only B 0 A
* *
all A B , only B A
+ +
all A 0 B only B A 0
Hence, ‘Only lawyers wear ties’ entails ‘Only people wear ties’ as well
as ‘Only lawyers wear loud ties’ – which seems reasonable enough,
though perhaps neither inference is pragmatically felicitous. Furthermore,
as on this analysis expressions of the form ‘only X’ create downward en-
tailing contexts, we should expect them to pattern with other negative-like
expressions:
14 See e.g. de Jong and Verkuyl (1985), Lappin and Reinhart (1988), McCawley (1993),
Geurts (2003).
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(38) a. {Never / rarely / only once} did Fred give us the pleasure of
singing ‘O sole mio’.
b. {Nobody / Few people / Only Wilma} had any cigars left.
(38a) shows that ‘only’ triggers inversion, and (38b) illustrates that its
second argument accommodates NPIs. In both respects, ‘only X’ behaves
like a downward entailing quantiﬁer expression, thus conﬁrming Horn’s
analysis.
Although in several respects we agree with Horn’s proposal, we don’t
subscribe to his central claim, that ‘only’ is a strong quantiﬁer. If ‘only’ is
to be analysed as a quantiﬁer at all, it resembles ‘some’ or ‘no’ more than
it does ‘all’ or ‘most’. To begin with, ‘only’ phrases are admitted in ‘there-
insertion’ contexts, as witness:
(39) There are {some / no / only / *all / *most} ﬁremen available.
This is prima facie evidence for regarding ‘only ﬁremen’ as weak, and this
initial impression is strengthened by the following observations:
(40) a. Only two days did Barney stay in Berlin.
b. Only two days ago Barney was staying in Berlin.
In (40a) ‘only’ takes scope over the remainder of the sentence, thus trig-
gering inversion. In the non-inverted (40b), by contrast, the scope of
‘only’ is restricted to the adverbial modiﬁer, and in this environment it
alternates with weak quantiﬁers only:
(41) {A couple of / some (*of the) / *all / *most} days ago Barney was
staying in Berlin.
Another problem with the idea that ‘only’ is a reversed universal
quantiﬁer is discussed by Horn himself. It is that the ﬁrst argument of
‘only’, which is upward entailing, occasionally admits NPIs:
(42) a. Only the students who had ever read anything about polarity
passed.
b. *All students who passed had ever read anything about
polarity.
(43) a. Only the guests who had seen any of the suspects were
questioned.
b. *All the guests who were questioned had seen any of the
suspects.
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The (b) sentences show that NPIs are not licensed in the scope of a uni-
versal quantiﬁer. Horn’s analysis predicts, accordingly, that the ﬁrst ar-
gument of ‘only’ should impose the same restriction. This prediction does
not square with the facts, as the (a) sentences demonstrate.
To sum up: analysing ‘only’ as a universal quantiﬁer is plausible
enough in view of the intuitive truth conditions of ‘only’-sentences and
the monotonicity inferences they give rise to. Furthermore, this analysis
explains why NPIs are licensed in the scope of ‘only’, and why ‘only’
triggers inversion. And last but not least, by appealing to the existential
import of strong quantiﬁers, it gives a principled account of the pre-
suppositions associated with ‘only’-sentences. On the down side, it is pre-
cisely the assumption that ‘only’ is strong that ﬂies in the face of various
observations suggesting that ‘only X’ is a weak quantiﬁer, and Horn’s
proposal fails to explain why at least some NPIs may occur in the (up-
ward entailing) focus argument of ‘only’.
Our proposal is to retain Horn’s truth conditions while altering the
logical form of ‘only’, adopting Geach’s (1962) suggestion that ‘Only A
B’ should be rendered as sbx[sAx5Bx]. So in the DRT framework (30)
comes out as follows:
(44) [x: Wilma(x), s[u: u0 x, u guessed the secret word]]
This is truth-conditionally equivalent to Horn’s analysis, and therefore
shares some of its signal virtues. In particular, it accounts for the monot-
onicity properties of ‘only’ in essentially the same way Horn’s proposal
does. However, in our analysis ‘only’ is not a (strong) universal quantiﬁer
but rather a negated existential expression, not unlike ‘no’, and therefore
weak. On the one hand, this is a change for the better, because we have
argued that there is reason to believe that ‘only’ is weak, but on the other
hand we also lose Horn’s explanation for the presupposition induced
by ‘only’, which hinges on the assumption that ‘only’ is strong. Here the
BPR comes to the rescue. For the same inferences that Horn puts down
to existential import can be explained by assuming, as we do, that back-
grounded material is presupposed. For example, given that ‘Wilma’ is the
focus of (30), the BPR gives rise to the following presuppositional ex-
pansion of (44):
(45) [x: Wilma(x), s[v: v guessed the secret word,
u: u0 x, u guessed the secret word]]
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In default of a suitable antecedent, we predict that the presupposition will
be accommodated in the main DRS, which yields:
(46) [x: Wilma(x), v: v guessed the secret word,
s[u: u0 x, u guessed the secret word]]
As in Horn’s account, this entails that Wilma guessed the secret word.
In (44)–(46) the presupposition induced by the BPR is accommodated
globally, and as long as a binding interpretation is not available, this op-
tion is strongly preferred. There are however related cases in which the
option of local accommodation is exercised; for example:
(47) a. Only Superman can help us now.
b. [: s[v: v can help, u: u0 Superman, u can help]]
c. [v: v can help, s[u: u0 Superman, u can help]]
d. [: s[v: v can help, u:0 Superman, u can help]]
In a context in which it is taken for granted that Superman doesn’t exist,
(47a) is a way of conveying that the interlocutors’ situation is hopeless.
This reading comes about as follows. The semantic representation of
(47a) is of course analogous to that of (30), and after the BPR has applied
we have (47b), which mirrors (45). Suppose now that, as in the previous
example, this presupposition is accommodated globally, as shown in
(47c). Given that it is part of the common ground that Superman doesn’t
exist, this reading would be inconsistent, and therefore the hearer decides
to accommodate the presupposition locally. So (47d) represents the ﬁnal
interpretation of (47a) and provided Superman doesn’t exist this DRS
entails that nobody can help us. Our analysis of one of the examples dis-
cussed by Horn (1996) is along the same lines:
(48) Only Kim can pass the test, and it’s possible even she can’t.
Global accommodation of the presupposition that someone can pass the
test would render the discourse infelicitous, and therefore the presupposi-
tion is accommodated locally.
We saw above how analysing ‘only’ as a universal quantiﬁer helps to
explain why NPIs are licensed in the scope of ‘only’, and as our analysis
gives the same truth conditions as Horn’s, it yields the same predictions.
However, we also saw that Horn’s theory doesn’t explain how NPIs may
enter the focus argument of ‘only’, which is upward entailing. Here our
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account suggests an straightforward solution: the semantic representation
of ‘only’ contains a wide-scope negation operator, and this is what ex-
plains why ‘only’ admits NPIs into a position that ought to repel them.
More generally, this explains the intuition that, notwithstanding the fact
that its truth conditions can be rendered by means of a universal quanti-
ﬁer, ‘only’ is somehow ‘more negative’ than ‘every’ and ‘all’.
So what underlies the contrast between the (a) and (b) sentences in (42)
and (43) is simply the fact that the semantic representation of ‘only’ con-
tains a negation operator, whereas the representations of ‘all’ and ‘every-
one’ don’t. It is in line with this explanation that NPIs should also occur
in certain other environments that ought to be allergic to NPI, as in the
following examples given by Horn (1996):
(49) a. Not all the guests who ate any of the contaminated squid be-
came ill.
b. Not everyone who has ever been to Groningen works on
polarity.
Here the NPIs ‘any’ and ‘ever’ occur in an upward-entailing environment,
too, the reason being, we suggest, that they are in the scope of a negation
operator.
Our story of ‘only’ explains how (50a) comes to imply that Muriel
voted for Hubert: this proposition is entailed by the conjunction of what
the sentence says and what it presupposes. Hence it is also explained why
(50b) does not imply that Muriel voted for Hubert: between them, the
sentence’s literal meaning and the presupposition that someone voted for
Hubert do not entail that Muriel voted for Hubert. But then how is it that
(50c) manages to convey that Muriel voted for Hubert?
(50) a. Only [Muriel]F voted for Hubert.
b. Maybe only [Muriel]F voted for Hubert.
c. Not only [Muriel]F voted for Hubert.
One suggestion is that (50c) conversationally implicates that Muriel
voted for Hubert. Someone who utters (50c) commits himself to the claim
that someone who is not identical to Muriel voted for Hubert, which is
less than what he would have conveyed by way of stating:
(51) [Muriel]F didn’t vote for Hubert.
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By uttering (51) instead of (50c) the speaker would have asserted that
Muriel didn’t vote for Hubert, and presupposed that someone did. So
(51) is more informative than (50c), and it is, if anything, simpler, to boot.
So why didn’t the speaker utter it instead of (50c)? Presumably because he
takes (51) to be false. Hence, the negation of (51) is a conversational im-
plicature of (50c).
Unfortunately, however, this cannot be the whole story, because it
doesn’t account for the surprising fact that that the inference in question
appears to exhibit projection behaviour:
(52) It is possible that not only [Muriel]F voted for Hubert.
Intuitively, this sentence, too, implies that Muriel voted for Hubert –
which is not the kind of behaviour one would expect from a conversa-
tional implicature. More generally, it seems that if a sentence of the form
‘Not only A B’ is embedded in a non-entailing position, there will be a
strong suggestion to the e¤ect that ‘A B’ is true. This behaviour is puz-
zling because it is not shared by the positive form, ‘Only A B’, as we have
argued as some length. Regrettably, we don’t see how this discrepancy
might be accounted for.
To conclude, ‘Only A B’ gives rise to the presupposition that B is non-
vacuous, but this presupposition is not triggered by the lexical content of
‘only’: its source is the focus/background division of the sentence, and
therefore it is not a lexical presupposition. To be sure, ‘only’ imposes
syntactic and semantic requirements on the focus/background division.
Most importantly, for the (semantic) purposes of this paper, it speciﬁes
that the backgrounded information is satisﬁed, if at all, by the focused
entity; in this respect ours is a localist analysis. But it is the BPR that ac-
counts for the presuppositions arising from ‘only’-sentences; and in this
respect our analysis is unabashedly centralist.
Too
According to the standard view ‘too’ contributes to the interpretation
of (53a) by inducing the presupposition that there is someone other
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than Mary who lives in London.15 (53a) is therefore said to presuppose
(53b):
(53) a. [Mary]F lives in London too.
b. bx[x0Mary5x lives in London]
However, as ﬁrst noted by Kripke (ms.), this alleged presupposition
is much too weak. In the overwhelming majority of contexts in which
London is part of the common ground, it may be taken for granted that
London has more than one inhabitant, hence (53b) is trivially true. So if
it presupposed no more than (53b), (53a) should be felicitous in practi-
cally any context, which is clearly not the case: when uttered out of the
blue this sentence will typically sound odd. Or, to put it di¤erently,
whatever the presupposition of ‘too’ may be, it is certainly more speciﬁc
than the existential one standardly assumed.
Another observation in the same vein, also due to Kripke, is the
following:
(54) a. If Herb comes to the party, [the boss]F comes, too.
b. Herb is not the boss.
Intuitively, a speaker who uttered (54a) would thereby commit himself
to the truth of (54b). However, if the focus particle ‘too’ merely induces
the existential presupposition that someone other than the boss comes to
the party, it is not clear how this commitment could come about. For that
presupposition would simply be absorbed in the antecedent of the condi-
tional, and not give rise to any additional inferences.
In view of these facts Kripke concludes that the standard view is
wrong, and that the presupposition of ‘too’ contains an anaphoric ele-
15 An alternative view is defended by Asher and Lascarides (1998: 248) who claim that ‘the
presupposition of too is rather that it requires that there be some proposition in the
context that bears the rhetorical relation Parallel to the content of the sentence in which
too occurs.’ Asher and Lascarides also maintain that ‘the presupposition triggered by
too must be introduced explicitly into the discourse context’ (ibid.); van Rooy (1997) at-
tributes the same claim to Kripke. This observation is not correct though, as Caesar’s
purported last words, ‘Tu quoque, Brute?’, illustrate. See Geurts (1999) for further dis-
cussion of this point. (Incidentally, as a matter of historical fact, Caesar’s last words
weren’t Latin: he addressed Brutus in Greek, the correct quote being: kai` su`, te´knon; i.e.
‘You too, my child?’ See Suetonius, De Vita Caesarum 1.82.)
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ment. Furthermore, according to Kripke, the consequent of (54a) does
not presuppose that someone other than Herb is coming to the party, but
instead gives rise to the more substantial presupposition that Herb is not
the boss. We will argue below that this last claim is not correct, but we
concur with Kripke’s that the presupposition associated with ‘too’ con-
tains an anaphoric element.
The behaviour of ‘too’ is special in other ways, as well. Zeevat (1992,
2002) observes that the presupposition induced by ‘too’ sometimes ap-
pears to have access to antecedent information that is inaccessible to
other presuppositions:
(55) a. ?It may be raining on my birthday, and I think it’s not fair that
it’s going to rain on my birthday
b. ?I suspect that Betty was considering taking karate lessons, and
she has stopped taking karate lessons.
c. Fred may be staying at the Ritz, and [Barney]F is at the Ritz,
too.
d. I suspect that Fred is staying at the Ritz, and [Barney]F is at
the Ritz, too.
(55a,b) illustrate that, in general, the antecedent of a presupposition
needs to be accessible (in DRT’s sense of accessibility). Antecedent mate-
rial introduced within the scope of a modal, as in (55a), or an attitude
verb, as in (55b), is inaccessible, and any attempts at taking it up result in
incoherence. Surprisingly, however, the presupposition induced by ‘too’
somehow manages to bypass this general accessibility constraint, as (55c,
d) show.
Yet another peculiarity of ‘too’, which we believe is related to Zeevat’s
observation, was ﬁrst pointed out by Fauconnier (1985; cf. also Heim
1992). It is that an occurrence of ‘too’ may have a fully transparent
reading, as witness the following example:
(56) The professor of computational theology is a freemason, and
Wilma believes that [the dean]F is a freemason, too.
Consider ﬁrst the deﬁnite noun phrase ‘the dean’. It is a familiar obser-
vation that this type of expression may be read ‘de re’, which is to say
that Wilma need not be aware that the person whom she takes to be
a freemason is the dean (she may know him only in his capacity of
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chairman of her badminton club, say). Following Quine’s (1960) usage,
this reading is sometimes called a transparent one, but it is not fully
transparent, because the expression ‘the dean’ still contributes something
to what Wilma is said to believe. The puzzling thing about the presuppo-
sition induced by ‘too’ is that it does seem to admit of such a fully trans-
parent construal: Wilma may felicitously be said to believe that ‘the dean
is a freemason, too’, without implying that she has any other persons in
mind whom she considers to be freemasons. Put otherwise, although ‘too’
occurs within the syntactic scope of ‘believes’ it need not be construed as
contributing anything whatsoever to what Wilma is said to believe.
In order to introduce our own view on ‘too’, let us ﬁrst consider an
analysis that does not work. We have seen that, according to Kripke, the
presupposition triggered by ‘too’ contains an anaphoric element, and it
might be thought that, within the framework of the binding theory, this
insight may be captured simply by treating the standard existential pre-
supposition as presuppositions are generally treated by our theory. This
will not do however. Suppose we try to deal with (54a) along these lines.
Then, prior to the resolution of the presupposition in question, we would
have the DRS in (57a):
(57) a. [u: Herb(u), v: boss(v),
[: comes(u)]) [x: x0 v, comes(x), comes(v)]]
b. [u: Herb(u), v: boss(v), [: comes(u), u0 v]) [: comes(v)]]
The presupposition in (57a) contains the same material as the existential
one traditionally attributed to ‘only’, though within the current frame-
work its status is rather di¤erent. Processing this presupposition as we
would any other, we observe that there is a suitable antecedent for it in
the ﬁrst part of the conditional, so we predict that there is a preference for
binding the presupposition there, which yields the representation in (57b);
and this is not quite what we should like to have, because it says that if
Herb comes to the party and if Herb is not the boss, then the boss will
come, too.
The core of the analysis of ‘too’ we advocate was ﬁrst endorse by Cor-
blin (1991) and Heim (1992); it retains Kripke’s insight that the presup-
position of ‘too’ contains an anaphoric element but implements it in a
way that deviates from Kripke’s. The fundamental idea is that ‘too’ has
two presuppositions, one of which is contained in the other. For example,
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someone who utters ‘[The vicar]F is depressed, too’ apparently has some
other person in mind whom he believes to be depressed. This information
is usually rolled together into one presupposition, but we contend that
there are actually two, to wit: that (i) there is some person x other than
the vicar such that (ii) x is depressed. The ﬁrst part resembles a pronoun
in the sense that it has no descriptive content to speak of, and therefore
should be hard to accommodate. The second part is richer in descriptive
content. In order to distinguish these two presuppositions, we shall call
them ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’, respectively. These two presuppositions
stem from di¤erent sources. The primary presupposition is triggered by
the lexical content of ‘too’. The secondary presupposition, on the other
hand, is induced by the BPR, so strictly speaking it is not part of the
contribution of ‘too’. So, as with ‘only’, the current proposal combines
localist and centralist elements. In the remainder of this section we will
show how this analysis accounts for the observations made above.
Assuming that the presuppositions of the proper name and the deﬁnite
description have been taken care of, we start out from the following the
semantic representation for Kripke’s example (54a):16
(58) [u: Herb(u), v: boss(v),
[: comes(u)]) [x: x0 v, comes(x), comes(v)]]
Here the secondary and primary presuppositions are underlined once and
twice, respectively. Given this initial representation the projection mech-
anism takes it usual course, starting with the primary presupposition.
This presupposition is bound to the discourse referent representing Herb,
resulting, after substitution, in the following DRS:
(59) [u: Herb(u), v: boss(v), u0 v,
[: comes(u)]) [: comes(u), comes(v)]]
Now only the secondary presupposition of ‘too’ remains to be processed,
and as this matches the material in the antecedent of the conditional, it is
bound there, yielding:
(60) [u: Herb(u), v: boss(v), u0 v, [: comes(u)]) [: comes(v)]]
16 An alternative, discussed by Beaver (2001: 94), is leave out the non-identity condition
and to treat the implication of distinctness at the level of Gricean pragmatics.
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This is precisely the reading we wanted to have. In particular, this DRS
entails that Herb is not the boss, which is a side e¤ect of binding the pri-
mary presupposition to Herb. Note that it is an essential prerequisite for
obtaining this construal that the presupposition of ‘too’ comes in two
parts, which can be resolved separately, so that one part can link to the
main DRS while the other projects to a subordinate DRS.
We have seen in the foregoing that the presupposition of ‘too’ is hard
if not impossible to interpret by way of accommodation, and following
Kripke’s lead it has been suggested by several authors that ‘too’ exhibits
the characteristic behaviour of pronominals in this regard.17 However,
this peculiarity has proved di‰cult to explain. In general, we believe,
semantically attenuate presuppositions tend to resist accommodation,
but then the presupposition associated with ‘too’ is anything but seman-
tically attenuate. An alternative explanation has been proposed by Zeevat
(2002), who claims that ‘too’ is semantically redundant though prag-
matically obligatory in contexts that provide a suitable antecedent. Ap-
pealing to a result in Blutner’s (2000) bi-directional optimality theory,
Zeevat argues that if a presuppositional expression has a simple non-
presuppositional alternative with the same truth conditions, it will resist
accommodation. There are several problems with this proposal. For ex-
ample, there are good reasons to doubt the conventional wisdom that
‘too’ is semantically inane, as e.g. the foregoing discussion of Kripke’s
example (54a) has shown (and further evidence will be presented below).
And if that supposition has to be given up, the very notion of expression
alternative becomes tenuous (Spenader 2002).
However, if we adopt the analysis of ‘too’ outlined in the foregoing, the
problem resolves in a natural way. ‘Too’ resembles an anaphoric pronoun
because one of its presuppositions is descriptively attenuate. It is this
presupposition that resists accommodation.
Whereas the primary presupposition of ‘too’ demands an antecedent,
there are cases in which the secondary presupposition is interpreted by
way of accommodation:
17 E.g. Heim (1992), Zeevat (1992, 2002), Beaver (1997), van Rooy (1997), Asher and
Lascarides (1998).
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(61) a. Either the boss will stay away from the party, or [Barney]F is
coming, too.
b. [u: boss(u), v: Barney(v),
[: not-comes(u)]4[x: x0 v, comes(x), comes(v)]]
c. [u: boss(u), v: Barney(v), u0 v,
[: not-comes(u)]4[: comes(u), comes(v)]]
Here the primary presupposition is bound in the main DRS. However,
the secondary presupposition cannot project to the global level, because
the resulting reading would be infelicitous; for it would say that the boss
is coming to the party and that either the boss will not come to the party
or that Barney will come too. Hence, the secondary presupposition is ac-
commodated locally, yielding the interpretation in (61c).
Focus particles like ‘too’ and ‘again’ have been called additive on the
grounds that they don’t constrain a sentence’s truth conditions (as ‘only’
does) but rather furnish additional information. Although this is not quite
correct, as some of the preceding examples demonstrate, there is a sense
in which additive particles are properly so-called: the presuppositional
proﬁle of additive focus particles is di¤erent from that of most other pre-
supposition inducers, and this di¤erence explains some of their idiosync-
racies, like the ones observed by Zeevat and Fauconnier, for example. To
explain this, let us ﬁrst brieﬂy recapitulate how mainstream presupposi-
tion triggers interact with DRT’s accessibility constraint.
(62) a. *It is possible that Switzerland has a navy. The Swiss navy is
stationed on Lake Geneva.
b. [: z[x: Swiss-navy(x)]]
c. [u: Swiss-navy(u), u is stationed on Lake Geneva]
d. [: z[x: Swiss-navy(x)], x is stationed on Lake Geneva]
The discourse in (62a) is odd, and in DRT the oddity is accounted for by
appeal to the fact that the antecedent of ‘the Swiss navy’ occurs in an in-
accessible position. But what does that mean? Consider the DRSs corre-
sponding to the two sentences in (62a), which are given in (62b) and (62c).
In order to process (62c) it would be merged with (62b), and then we
would try to resolve the underlined presupposition. Suppose now that we
were to link this presupposition to its antecedent within the scope of the
modal operator. Then the resulting representation would be (62d), and
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this DRS is defective, because it contains a free occurrence of the dis-
course referent x. This is what underwrites the notion of accessibility.
So, ‘x is inaccessible to y’ is best seen as an abbreviation for ‘if y were
bound to x, we would have a defective DRS on our hands.’ However, this
abbreviation is contingent upon the condition that presupposed and non-
presupposed material share at least one discourse referent. For example,
if the non-presupposed part of (62c) did not use the discourse referent u,
binding the presupposition to an inaccessible antecedent would not result
in a defective DRS. DRT’s accessibility constraint tacitly assumes that
this type of situation will not occur. We submit that this assumption,
though valid for most presuppositions, does not hold for all, and that the
secondary presupposition of ‘too’ (or any other additive focus particle,
for that matter) is an exception. In our view, this is why ‘too’ can link up
to ‘inaccessible’ antecedents.
To illustrate this idea, consider how we propose to handle (55c), re-
peated here as (63a):
(63) a. Fred may be staying at the Ritz, and [Barney]F is at the Ritz,
too.
b. [x: Fred(x), z[: stay-at-R(x)],
u: Barney(u), stay-at-R(u), v: v0 u, stay-at-R(v)]
c. [x: Fred(x), z[: stay-at-R(x)],
u: Barney(u), x0 u, stay-at-R(u), stay-at-R(v)]
d. [x: Fred(x), z[: stay-at-R(x)],
u: Barney(u), x0 u, stay-at-R(u)]
(63b) is the initial semantic representation of (63a), in which in only the
presuppositions associated with ‘too’ remain to be resolved. The primary
presupposition is straightforward: v is bound to x, which is accessible to
it, because both discourse referents are in the main DRS; the resulting
representation is (63c). Now the secondary presupposition can be bound
to its antecedent, which is contained in an embedded DRS and is there-
fore formally inaccessible to it. However, binding the presupposition to
its intended antecedent yields a perfectly well-formed DRS, and therefore
this procedure is unobjectionable, and even preferred, because the pre-
supposition would have to be accommodated otherwise. So the reading
we predict is (63d), which appears to be correct.
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A related line of explanation applies to (56), repeated below as (64a),
which we used to illustrate that an occurrence of ‘too’ within the scope of
an attitude verb may have a fully transparent reading.
(64) a. The professor of computational theology is a freemason, and
Wilma believes that [the dean]F is a freemason, too.
b. [x: CT-prof(x), freemason(x), u: dean(u),
Wilma believes: [v: v0 u, freemason(v), freemason(u)]]
c. [x: CT-prof(x), freemason(x), u: dean(u), x0 u,
Wilma believes: [: freemason(u)]]
In (64b), which is the initial representation of (64a), the presuppositions
associated with ‘too’ are triggered within an attitude context. Both the
primary and the secondary presupposition are bound in the main DRS,
and the resulting interpretation is (64c). Note that in the subordinate
DRS characterising Wilma’s belief, no trace is left of the presupposition
that was triggered there. In this way we account for the fact that ‘too’ in
(64a) can have a fully transparent construal.
To sum up, we have proposed that the presupposition which is com-
monly associated with ‘too’ actually falls into two parts. One part is pe-
culiar to ‘too’, and must therefore be encoded in its lexical content. The
other falls under the BPR, hence does not count as a lexical presupposi-
tion. Our analysis of ‘too’ resembles that of ‘only’ in that both contain
localist as well as centralist elements. The main di¤erences are that ‘too’
triggers a presupposition of its own, and that the secondary presupposi-
tion of ‘too’ is additive in the sense that it can be divorced from the envi-
ronment in which it is triggered, which is why ‘too’ allows for fully
transparent construals, and is able to link up to antecedents in formally
inaccessible positions.
6. Anything wrong with the BPR?
Thus far our argument for the BPR has been constructive: we have tried
to show that adopting this principle allows us to explain a broad range of
phenomena, some of which cannot be handled, as far as we can see,
without it. In the remainder of this paper we adopt a defensive stance,
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and attempt to refute some of the objections that have been raised against
the BPR.
As we noted in the introduction, the BPR has had a curious history.
Although the notion that backgrounded material is presupposed is more
than three decades old, its foes seem to have taken it more seriously than
its friends have: while ours appears to be the ﬁrst more or less sustained
attempt at arguing in favour of the BPR, there have been some extended
critiques of the BPR, two of which are of a recent vintage (Dryer 1996,
Rooth 1999). In the following we investigate what we take to be their
main complaints.
Nobody and somebody
Jackendo¤ (1972) was the ﬁrst to observe that, prima facie at least, data
like the following are problematic for the BPR (cf. also Rochemont 1986,
Dryer 1996):
(65) NObody shot the sheri¤.
With emphasis on ‘nobody’, so the argument goes, the backgrounded
material in this sentence must be ‘x shot the sheri¤ ’, and therefore the
BPR induces the presupposition that somebody shot the sheri¤, which
is obviously false. Thus formulated, the argument only goes through if it
is assumed that presuppositions, once triggered, cannot be cancelled any-
more, for if that were a possibility it might be held that this is precisely
what happens in cases like the above. However, there is a broad consen-
sus nowadays that presuppositions are not cancelable.
Something that seems not to have been noted before is that the prob-
lem exempliﬁed by (65) is not conﬁned to negative quantiﬁers such as
‘nobody’:
(66) SOMEbody shot the sheri¤.
If this sentence presupposed that somebody shot the sheri¤, we would
predict that the sentence presupposes what it asserts – which ﬂies in the
face of the well-nigh universal opinion that presupposition and assertion
are in complementary distribution. This may not seem as bad predicting
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that presupposition and assertion contradict each other, but it is bad
enough.
One possible way of dealing with the problems presented by (65) and
(66) is to fall back on the view that the BPR applies by default only. As
explained in the introduction, we are not at all convinced that the BPR
must be viewed as a law that allows of no exceptions, and we would be
just as happy arguing that it is a default rule, which is triggered only ce-
teris paribus; and perhaps ceteris aren’t paribus in cases like (65) and (66).
However, we prefer not adopt this course because we believe that there is
a much better line of defense.
The arguments presented above hinge on an assumption that we reject,
namely that in sentences like (65) and (66) the subject NP has narrow fo-
cus, and therefore the VP is backgrounded. Instead, we will argue, these
phenomena are better viewed as instances of polarity focus, and if this
much is right the problem posed by Jackendo¤ and his followers doesn’t
even arise.
The notion of polarity focus was introduced by Gussenhoven (1984) in
his discussion of examples such as the following:
(67) a. The house ISn’t on ﬁre.
b. The house is NOT on ﬁre.
c. (Stop squirting WATer all over the house. I TOLD you:) The
house isn’t ON ﬁre.
(68) A: Why didn’t you take the garbage out?
B: I TOOK the garbage out.
(69) A: I wish we were in FRANCE.
B: We ARE in France.
B 0: We’re IN France.
While these examples diverge in various ways, which Gussenhoven (1984)
and Bolinger (1989) discuss in some detail, they have one thing in com-
mon: the sentence focuses not on this or that constituent but on the status
of the entire proposition expressed. In all of these cases, that proposition
is treated as given material, and the sentence’s point is just to a‰rm or
deny it. Common ways of signaling polarity focus are accentuation of the
sentence’s positive or negative nexus, such as the ﬁnite verb, as in (67a),
(68B), and (69B), the main negation, as in (67b), or an a‰rmative focus
particle like Dutch ‘wel’:
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(70) Fred is WEL ziek.
Fred is [a‰rmative particle] sick
which translates into English as ‘Fred IS sick.’ In some languages, polar-
ity accents may occupy somewhat unexpected positions, as witness ex-
amples (67c) and (69B 0). It is not entirely clear why languages should al-
low polarity focus to be marked this way, and we will not try to solve that
puzzle, but these observations are still to the point, because they highlight
the fact that polarity accents are relatively free. For example, in (67) the
accents occur in positions that are quite di¤erent from a grammatical
point of view, but in each case they signal polarity focus.
We maintain that (65) and (66), too, are instances of polarity focus
and that in neither example there is narrow focus on the subject. Thus,
(65) is not to be understood as: ‘x shot the sheri¤ ’ is true for
x ¼ ‘nobody’, as opposed to, say, x is John or x is Mary; rather, the
alternatives under consideration are ‘Somebody shot the sheri¤ ’ and
‘Nobody shot the sheri¤ ’, and the only thing the sentence does is select
the latter. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for (66). In both cases the
presupposition induced by the BPR is that one of the alternatives con-
stituting the background is true. In the present case its e¤ect will thus be
to induce the trivial presupposition that the sheri¤ was either shot or
wasn’t. Semantically this boils down to inducing no presupposition
whatsoever.
It is fairly obvious why (65) and (66) shouldn’t allow for a construal
which has narrow focus on the subject term. The non-logical part of
the semantic content of words like ‘somebody’ and ‘nobody’ is so general
that it is unlikely to attract the focus of a statement; ‘somebody’ cannot
be used to mean ‘some person, as opposed to some vehicle’ (say). What
remains to be focused is the negative part of ‘nobody’ and the corre-
sponding positive component of ‘somebody’, which is what determines
the polarity of the sentence.
(65) and (66) are marked forms, which call for special circumstances. A
situation in which (65) would be appropriate would be one in which
someone had just claimed or implied that someone shot the sheri¤, and
(66) would be suitable when someone had claimed or implied the opposite
(cf. the exchanges in (68) and (69)). In either case, the issue whether
someone shot the sheri¤ is already ‘in the air’, and only which alternative
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is true is at issue. In a word, rather than arguing against the BPR, (65)
and (66) provide additional evidence in its favour.
It-clefts vs focus
In the presupposition literature it is standardly assumed that the cleft
sentence in (71a) presupposes that someone is playing the trombone:
(71) a. It is [Barney]F who is playing the trombone.
b. [Barney]F is playing the trombone.
Our theory of focusing implies that (71b), too, presupposes that someone
is playing the trombone. It seems to follow that on our account the prag-
matic e¤ects of clefting and focusing should be the same, but as Dryer
(1996) and Rooth (1999) have argued, this prediction is not borne out by
the facts. There are di¤erences between cleft sentences and corresponding
focus constructions which suggest that the presuppositions triggered by
clefts behave di¤erently from the ones induced by focusing. In the fol-
lowing we try to make out why that should be the case.
To explain in what way (71a) diverges from (71b), let us begin by
comparing the following exchanges:
(72) A: What’s that noise? Is anybody playing the trombone?
B: I don’t know, but I’m sure [Barney]F isn’t playing the
trombone.
B 0: I don’t know, but I’m sure it isn’t [Barney]F who is playing
the trombone.
Although we hesitate to accept Dryer’s (1996) judgment that (72B 0) is
downright infelicitous, we concede that it is less natural than (72B). A
related contrast can be observed in the following example.
(73) a. If [Beryl]F proposed to Fred, he will be pleased.
b. If it is [Beryl]F who proposed to Fred, he will be pleased.
(73b) presupposes that someone proposed to Fred, and it is hard if
not impossible to read the sentence without that presupposition. In this
respect the cleft sentence contrasts with the focus construction in (73a),
whose presupposition seems less resilient: though initially the sentence
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implies that someone proposed to Fred, it seems possible to suppress that
inference.
The foregoing observations suggest that the presuppositions triggered
by clefts are more robust than the corresponding inferences induced by
focusing in that the requirement that a suitable antecedent be available is
stronger for clefts than it is for focus constructions. Intuitively speaking,
clefts seem to be ‘more anaphoric’. This intuitive diagnosis is in line with
various corpus studies showing that, by and large, it-clefts are used only
when an explicit antecedent is available (Prince 1978, Delin 1992, Spe-
nader 2002). There are systematic exceptions to this general rule, but they
tend to follow conventional patterns, as in the following attested exam-
ples borrowed from Prince (1978):
(74) a. It was in this year that Yekuno Amlak, a local chieftain in the
Amba-Sel area, acceded to the so-called Solomonic throne.
b. It is with great honor and pleasure that I announce Hilary
Putnam.
The key to understanding why it-clefts behave as they do, we believe,
lies in the pronoun ‘it’. Although cleft pronouns are often classiﬁed as
expletives with no semantic or pragmatic force of their own, it has been
argued by several authors that this is not right.18 To see why, consider the
following examples:
(75) a. {It / *This / *That} seems to me that you’re out of line.
b. {It / *This / *That} is raining.
c. {It / This / That} was Fred we just saw.
d. {It / This / That} is completely beside the point.
The ‘it’ in (75a) is an expletive form by any light, whereas the ‘it’ in (75d)
is obviously referential, and while the latter alternates with the demon-
stratives ‘this’ and ‘that’, the former does not, presumably because de-
monstrative pronouns are always referential. The key observation is that,
while ambient ‘it’ behaves like an expletive, the cleft pronoun patterns not
with expletive but rather with referential ‘it’. Similar observations have
been made in other languages (Gundel 1977, Hedberg 2000).
18 See e.g. Bolinger (1972), Gundel (1977), Borkin (1984), Hedberg (2000).
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It turns out, therefore, that the presuppositions generally attributed to
it-clefts have an internal structure similar to the one we have ascribed to
the focus particle ‘too’. There are two di¤erences though. First, whereas
the descriptively attenuate element in the presupposition of ‘too’ is covert,
the corresponding element in the presupposition of a cleft sentence sur-
faces as a personal pronoun. Secondly, the presupposition triggered by a
cleft pronoun is not quite like the presuppositions that come with ‘nor-
mal’ uses of pronominals:
(76) a. {It / *He} was Wilbur who pressed the button.
b. Guess who I saw at the swimming pool? {It / *He} was Alfred
Tarski!
As shown by (76a) cleft pronouns have to be neuter, and the same holds
for pronominal subjects of copula sentences like (76b). The reason for
this, apparently, is that both types of sentences have an identifying func-
tion (cf. Bosch 1983).
Regardless what a full-ﬂedged analysis of it-clefts is going to look like,
the foregoing observations su‰ce to conclude that there is a di¤erence
after all between the cleft sentence in (71a) and the corresponding focus
construction in (71b): the former contains an anaphoric pronoun whereas
the latter does not, and it is for this reason, presumably, that the cleft
presupposition is so di‰cult to accommodate. The situation is thus anal-
ogous to the one we observed with ‘too’. Such di¤erences as there are
between it-clefts and the corresponding focus constructions do not un-
dercut but rather conﬁrm the central tenet of this paper.
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